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Abstract
Docker container virtualization technology is being widely adopted in cloud computing
environments because of its lightweight and efficiency. However, it requires adequate
control and management via an orchestrator. As a result, cloud providers are adopt-
ing the open-access Kubernetes platform as the standard orchestrator of containerized
applications. To ensure applications’ availability in Kubernetes, the latter uses Raft
protocol’s replication mechanism. Despite its simplicity, Raft assumes that machines
fail only when shutdown. This failure event is rarely the only reason for a machine’s
malfunction. Indeed, software errors or malicious attacks can cause machines to exhibit
Byzantine (i.e. random) behavior and thereby corrupt the accuracy and availability of
the replication protocol. In this paper, we propose a Kubernetes multi-Master Robust
(KmMR) platform to overcome this limitation. KmMR is based on the adaptation
and integration of the BFT-SMaRt fault-tolerant replication protocol into Kubernetes
environment. Unlike Raft protocol, BFT-SMaRt is resistant to both Byzantine and
non-Byzantine faults. Experimental results show that KmMR is able to guarantee the
continuity of services, even when the total number of tolerated faults is exceeded. In
addition, KmMR provides on average a consensus time 1000 times shorter than that
achieved by the conventional platform (with Raft), in such condition. Finally, we show
that KmMR generates a small additional cost in terms of resource consumption com-
pared to the conventional platform.
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1. Introduction
Faced with the continuous increase in capital expenditure and operating expendi-
ture costs of fully reliable and available Information Technology (IT) systems, compa-
nies tend towards outsourcing their IT services to specialized companies such as cloud
service providers. The main advantage of this strategy is to claim an excellent service
quality while paying only for the necessary and consumed resources. As for the service
provider, its purpose is to meet the needs of clients by providing the required resources
when demanded. A common approach is to pool (or slice) its resources to share them
between several clients. In this context, many challenges emerge to provide a reli-
able cloud environment, e.g., quality-of-service guarantee, resources management, and
service continuity.
In order to exploit efficiently the service provider’s resources, the virtualization
technology has been introduced [1, 2]. The latter allows the services to see the re-
sources, e.g., servers, routers, communication links, and data storage, in a manner
that is independent from the physical infrastructure/equipment, and to use these re-
sources based on service requirements, rather than on physical granularity. In partic-
ular, servers virtualization using containers, called also containerization, has gained
popularity among cloud service providers, since it addresses issues, such as the ineffi-
cient use of resources [3, 4]. Unlike full-hardware virtualization, such as VMware [1],
containerization leverages virtualization at the operating system level, hence generating
a lighter overhead. In such system, the resource allocation unit is the container. The lat-
ter is defined as the virtual runtime environment running atop a single operating system
kernel and emulating an operating system. Several implementation platforms are avail-
able for containerization, such as LXC, OpenVZ and Docker [3, 4, 5]. Nevertheless,
Docker stands out as the most interesting container-based virtualization platform as it
provides the simplest lightweight and scalable way of creating and deploying contain-
ers, besides its large spectrum of use cases, including hybrid clouds [6], microservices
[7], infrastructure optimization [8] and big data [9].
In a container-based server platform, containerized applications need to be man-
aged, i.e., a container hosting an application is dynamically deployed, run, then re-
moved. The management of these operations in a container-based virtualization plat-
form is called Containers Orchestration. Containers Orchestration is a complex task
that requires a very light but efficient mechanism for automated deployment, scaling,
and management of containers. For instance, to efficiently manage Docker containers,
cloud service providers such as Google, Docker, Mesosphere, Microsoft, VMware,
IBM and Oracle adopted Kubernetes as their standard platform to orchestrate con-
tainerized applications [10, 11, 12]. Kubernetes is a Google open project advocating
the vision of a modular, customizable and therefore scalable orchestration platform [3].
In order to guarantee the availability and continuity of hosted applications, Kubernetes
uses the Raft protocol. The latter replicates the states between the machines hosting
the containers, where each state is an image of the hosted containerized applications
[13, 14]. In spite of its simplicity and rapidity in the replication process, Raft proto-
col has major limitations when it comes to machines’ failure. Indeed, Raft can only
detect and correctly deal with shutdown events of machines. In other words, if a ma-
chine experiences a Byzantine (random) behavior, Raft is unable to guarantee service
continuity [14, 15, 16]. Indeed, Byzantine behaviors, such as delayed, dropped, or cor-
rupted messages, or abnormally executed processes have been widely observed in real
systems, as summarized in [17].
Being conscious of the risks of software errors and malicious attacks that can push
a machine into a Byzantine behavior, we propose in this paper the adaptation and inte-
gration of the BFT-SMaRt fault-tolerant replication protocol into Kubernetes. By doing
so, we expect our proposed platform to resist to any type of faults while guaranteeing
service continuity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that proposes a
Kubernetes platform tolerant to Byzantine and non-Byzantine faults.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1. We present an overview of Docker virtualization, Kubernetes platform, fault-
tolerance within this platform and its limits.
2. We propose the Kubernetes multi-Master Robust (KmMR) platform, a platform
tolerant to Byzantine and non-Byzantine faults. KmMR is based on the integra-
tion of BFT-SMaRt into Kubernetes environment.
3. We propose an efficient method to adapt and integrate the replication protocol
BFT-SMaRt (written in Java) into Kubernetes (written in Golang).
4. We implement the proposed KmMR solution in an OpenStack-based cloud envi-
ronment, evaluate its performances and compare it to the conventional platform,
called Kubernetetes multi-Master Conventional (KmMC). Comparison is real-
ized through experiments in non-Byzantine and Byzatine environments, where
both crash and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are performed to
destabilize the machines and corrupt their replication process. The obtained re-
sults confirm the effectiveness and robustness of KmMR.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes Docker container-
ization technology. In section III, the Docker containers orchestration platform Ku-
bernetes is explained. Whereas, section IV discusses fault-tolerance in Kubernetes.
Section V presents our KmMR platform. Experimental evaluation and results are dis-
cussed in Section VI. Finally, section VII closes the paper.
2. Background
In this section, we present an overview of Docker containers and its orchestration
mechanism, supported by Kubernetes.
2.1. Docker Containers
Container virtualization, also known as containerization, relies directly on kernel
functionalities to create isolated virtual environments, as illustrated in Fig. 1. These
virtual environments are named containers, while the features provided by the operat-
ing system kernel are called namespaces and cgroups [19]. The namespaces control
and limit the amount of resources used for a process, while the cgroups manage the
resources of a process group. Hence, a container provides the resources needed to run
Figure 1: From virtual machines to containers [18]
applications as if they were the only processes running in the host machine’s operating
system.
Even though several containerization platforms have been proposed, such as LXC,
OpenVZ and Docker [3, 4, 5], only Docker sparked interest and popularity among the
research and professional communities thanks to its operational simplicity and flexi-
bility. Indeed, traditional virtualization uses a Hypervisor to create virtual machines,
deploy guest operating systems on them, and host the applications [20]. Whereas,
Docker containerization requires only the installation of the Docker container engine
on the operating system’s kernel of the host machine, allowing the creation of contain-
ers that host the applications. Nevertheless, both are autonomous systems that use a
higher system, i.e., the one of the host machine, to perform their tasks. The differ-
ence is that virtual machines must contain a whole guest operating system, while the
containers use directly the one of the host machine. Fig. 1 illustrates an architectural
comparison of traditional virtualization and containerization.
Docker is a complex but very intuitive ecosystem for container development. It is
mainly composed of six elements, as shown in Fig. 2:
1. Docker Client: It is the command line interface tool used to configure and inter-
act with Docker. For any Docker command instruction (e.g., docker run), the
client sends the command to Docker daemon (dockerd) that carries it out.
Figure 2: Components of Docker [18]
2. Docker Daemon: It is the Docker server that listens to the application program-
ming interface requests and manages Docker objects, such as images, containers,
networks, and volumes, etc.
3. Docker Images: An image is a read-only template/snapshot, pulled or pushed
from a public or a private repository, in order to create a Docker container. This
is the building block of Docker. It is lightweight, small, and fast compared to
those of traditional virtual machines.
4. Docker file: It is used to build Docker images.
5. Docker Containers: Basically, a Docker container is a user space of the operating
system. It is composed of a set of processes isolated from the rest of the system,
and running from an image that provides necessary files to support the processes
of the hosted application.
6. Docker registries: Registries are the central repository and distribution compo-
nent of Docker images.
7. Docker Engine: It combines the Docker daemon, application programming in-
terface and the command line interface tools.
By its simplicity and small number of components, the Docker architecture pro-
vides interesting advantages [21, 22, 23]:
1. Deployment rapidity: Docker achieves fast operations, such as communication,
and container building, testing and deployment.
2. Applications Portability: Containerized applications are easily portable, as they
can be moved around as a single unit, without affecting their response perfor-
mances or the containers.
3. Fast service delivery: Docker containers format is standardized, such that pro-
grammers and administrators tasks do not interfere when deploying them. In-
deed, Docker provides a reliable, consistent, and enhanced environment that
achieves predictable outputs when codes are moved between development, test
and deployment platforms.
4. Density: Docker uses the available resources more efficiently compared to vir-
tual machines, since it does not rely on a Hypervisor. It is able to run densely
several containers on the same single host, hence optimally using the resources
and increasing its performance, compared to virtual machines.
5. Scalability: Docker can be deployed in several physical servers, data servers, and
cloud platforms without any restriction. Containers can be easily moved from a
cloud environment to a local host and vis-versa, at a fast pace. Deployment
adjustments can be easily realized according to needs.
In Table 1, we summarize the characteristics of virtual machines and Docker con-
tainers. Accordingly, the Docker container can be created and removed almost in real
time and thus introduces a negligible task overload with respect to the host machine’s
resources use [22, 24, 25]. Compared to virtual machines, Docker containers are ad-
vantageous in terms of network management, boot speed, deployment/migration flex-
ibility, and resources use, e.g. RAM, storage, etc. [22]. However, they suffer from
the weak isolation of the host machine. Indeed, if a Docker container is compromised,
then an attacker can get full access to the operating system of the host machine [26, 27].
Consequently, there is an urgent need for a robust and secured environment for Docker
containers. Moreover, Docker is unable on its own to deploy containers on distributed
Table 1: Characteristics of Virtualization Technologies
Parameters Virtual Machines Docker Containers
Operating System
Every virtual machine virtu-
alizes the host material and
loads its own guest operating
system
No container emulates host
material. Host operating sys-
tem is used.
Communication Through Ethernet peripherals
Through Inter-Process Com-
munication standard mecha-
nisms, e.g., sockets, pipes,
shared memory, etc.
Resources Usage
(CPU and RAM)
High Quasi-native
Startup time Few minutes Few seconds
Storage
High requirement for guest
operating system and associ-
ated software installation and
execution
Low since host operating sys-
tem is used
Isolation
Libraries and files’ sharing
among virtual machines is
impossible
Libraries and files can be
seamlessly mounted and
shared
Security
Depends on the Hypervisor’s
configuration
Requires access control
machines and ensure their interaction [26]. In this matter, an orchestration mechanism
is needed to manage Docker containers in distributed systems.
2.2. Containers Orchestration
Handling a few Docker containers on one machine is an easy task. However, when
it comes to moving these containers into production on a set of distributed hosts, many
questions arise. Indeed, driven by providing availability, scaling, and networking, an
integration and management tool is required not only to ensure initial containers de-
ployment, but to also manage multiple and dynamic containers as one entity. Clearly,
handling everything manually is not conceivable because it would be very difficult to
ensure the viability, maintenance and sustainability of the system. Thus, the process
of deploying multiple containers can be optimized through automation, especially in
large scale systems. This type of automation is referred to as orchestration and includes
features like work nodes’ location determination, load balancing, inter-container com-
munication, service discovery, status updates, containers migrations, scaling up, and
tolerance to malfunctions.
Several orchestrators have been proposed and implemented to manage Docker
container-based platforms. Examples include Fleet [28], Mesos [29], Swarm [30]
and Kubernetes [31]. In the remainder of this paper, we are interested in Kubernetes
only. The latter is a stable and free solution that can automate the deployment, mi-
gration, monitoring, networking, scalability, and availability of applications hosted in
container-based server platforms [4, 11].
3. Kubernetes: An Open-Access Orchestrator of Docker Containers
Kubernetes, abbreviated K8s, is a project initiated by Google in 2014 when it saw
the advantages of Docker containers over traditional virtualization. The Kubernetes
Orchestrator automates the deployment and management of large-scale containerized
applications, such as applications’ microservices generation [7], cloud services to store,
access, edit and share video content [32], and mission critical services as telecommu-
nications and energy delivery services [33, 34]. Its platform runs and coordinates con-
tainers on sets of physical and/or virtual machines. Kubernetes is designed to fully
Figure 3: Architecture of Kubernetes (ex: one master node and one work node)
manage the life cycle of containerized applications, using predictability, extensibility,
and high availability methods, as detailed in [35, 36].
3.1. Kubernetes Architecture
Kubernetes architecture is based on the master/slave model [37]. It consists of a
cluster of one master node and several work nodes, called minions, as shown in Fig.
3. Their roles are given as follows:
Kubernetes master: This node is responsible of the overall management and availabil-
ity of the Kubernetes cluster. Its components, i.e. the Application Programming In-
terface (API) server, controller and scheduler, support the interaction, monitoring and
scheduling tasks within the cluster. The API server provides the interface to the shared
state of the cluster through which the other components, e.g. work nodes, interact. The
controller monitors the shared state of the cluster through the API server and makes
decisions to bring the cluster back from an unstable state to a stable one. The sched-
uler manages the cluster load. It takes into account individual and collective resource
requirements, quality-of-service requirements, hardware/software constraints, policies,
etc. The Kubernetes cluster data is stored in a database, e.g. etcd [38], whereas cluster
administration is at the master level via the K8s command-line interface kubectl. The
latter stores its configuration and authentication information to access the API server
in the kubeconfig file.
Kubernetes minions: Containerized applications run on these nodes. On one hand,
the client nodes communicate with the work node via their kubelet through the mas-
ter node. The kubelet receives commands from the master node and executes them
through its Docker engine. It also reports the state of the work node to the API server.
On the other hand, the kube-proxy runs on each work node to manage clients’ access to
deployed services. Each service is compiled into one or many Pods. A Pod is a logical
set of one or several containers. This is the smallest unit that can be programmed as a
deployment in Kubernetes. Containers in the same Pod share resources such as storage
capacity, IP address, etc.
3.2. Pods Instantiation
In Kubernetes, the placement of Pods is realized following a specific strategy. In
fact, considering a Kubernetes cluster consisting of a master node and a finite set of
minions M = {M1,M2, ...,Mn}, a pod P (t,m, p, v) asking for t CPU cycles, m
RAM, a specific communication port p and a v storage capacity, needs to be deployed
within the cluster. To select the minion on which the pod will be instantiated, the
K8s master node proceeds in two steps: 1) it filters the minions. Then, 2) it ranks the
remaining minions to determine the best one suited for the pod. These two steps are
detailed as follows:
Filtering: In this operation, nodes without required resources (t,m, p, v) are removed.
Kubernetes uses multiple predicates to perform filtering, including:
• PodFitsResources: does the node have enough resources (CPU and RAM) to
accommodate the pod?
• PodFitsHostPorts: is the node able to run the pod via the p port without conflicts?
• NoVolumeZoneConflict: does the node have the amount of v storage that the pod
requests?
• MatchNodeSelector: does the node match the parameters of the selector query
defined in the pod description?
These predicates can be combined to set up sophisticated filters.
Ranking: After filtering, Kubernetes uses priority functions to determine the best
minion among the nodes able to host the pod. A priority function assigns a score
between 0 and 10 where 0 is the least preferred and 10 is the most preferred node.
Each priority function is weighted by a positive number and the final score is the sum
of the weighted scores. The main priority functions that can be activated in Kubernetes
are:
• BalancedResourceAllocation: it aims at balancing the minions charge. Indeed,
it places the pod in a node in a way that the resource utilization rate (CPU and
RAM) is balanced among the minions.
• LeastRequestedPriority: it favors the node that has most resources available.
• CalculateSpreadPriority: it minimizes the number of pods belonging to the same
service on the same node.
• CalculateAntiAffinityPriority: it minimizes the number of pods belonging to the
same service on nodes sharing a particular attribute or label.
• CalculateNodeLabelPriority: it favors nodes with a specific label.
Once the final scores of all nodes are calculated, the minion having the highest score
is selecte to instantiate the pod. If there is more than one minion that has the highest
score, the master node selects one of them randomly.
4. Fault Tolerance in Kubernetes
In this section, we explain the fault tolerance mechanism in Kubernetes. We start
by a brief description of faults. Next, we present the associated consensus problem.
Finally, the built-in fault tolerance protocol “Raft" is detailed.
4.1. Background
The robustness of a system refers to its ability to continue functioning when part
of the system fails [39]. A system fails when the outputs are no longer conform to the
original specification. The occurrence of a failure can be: 1) transient, i.e. appears,
disappears and never occur again, 2) intermittent, i.e. reproducible in a given context
and 3) persistent, i.e. appears until repair. A non-faulty (non-failing) node or process
is called correct when it follows its specifications. Whereas, a faulty node/process
may stop or exhibits a random behavior. In general, failures/faults may be caused by
software defects, malicious attacks, or human-machine interaction errors. In distributed
systems orchestrated by Kubernetes, faults may occur at the master node or minions.
They can be classified into two categories:
1. Fail-stop faults: They are characterized by the complete activity’s stop (or crash)
of a node. This state is perceived by others as the absence of expected messages
until the eventual application’s termination. A system that is able to detect only
these faults considers that a node/process can be in one of two states, either it
works and gives the correct result, or it does nothing.
2. Byzantine faults: Byzantine faults are characterized by any behavior deviat-
ing from the node/process’s specifications and producing non-conform results
[40]. We distinguish between natural Byzantine faults, such as undetected phys-
ical errors on messages’ transmissions, memory and instructions, and malicious
Byzantine faults, designed to defeat the system, such as viruses, worms and sab-
otage instructions.
In large and/or uncontrolled systems, the risk of faults is high and shall be mitigated to
ensure service continuity. One way to realize it is to use the State Machine Replication
(SMR) mechanism [41]. The latter consists of using multiple copies of a system, im-
plemented as a state machine, to tolerate faults and keep the system’s availability. Each
copy of the system, called a replica, is placed on a different node [42]. SMR allows a
set of nodes to execute the same instruction sequences on each request sent by a client.
There are two approaches to execute requests: 1) active replication, where all nodes
execute requests, update their state machines, and respond to clients. And 2) passive
replication, where only one node, called leader, executes the requests and forwards
state machine changes to other nodes, then responds to clients.
To avoid inconsistency in replication, nodes/replicas need to be sure that their state
machines are identical before responding to clients. The following section describes
this state machine replication problem, called the Consensus problem.
4.2. Consensus Problem
The Consensus is a fundamental condition in fault-tolerant distributed systems. It
consists of tuning replicas’ values to the same one, proposed by one of the nodes. The
Consensus problem can be formulated as follows: We assume a system composed of a
set N = {N1, N2, . . . , Nn} of n replicated nodes, and that at most only f nodes can
fail, where f ≤ n − 1. Let N ′ ⊆ N be a subset of m ≤ n nodes. The consensus
problem consists of finding a protocol that allows the following:
1. Any node ∈ N ′ can propose a replica’s value to the other nodes.
2. When all nodes agree on the same value, a consensus is achieved.
Without loss of generality, protocols that satisfy these conditions, possess four proper-
ties [43]:
1. Termination: Each correct node eventually decides a value.
2. Validity: The decided value has been proposed by one or many other nodes.
3. Integrity: The decision is unique and final.
4. Agreement: Two correct nodes cannot decide different values.
According to [42], any protocol that verifies the following safety and liveness condi-
tions has the previous four properties:
1. Safety: All the correct replicas execute the requests they receive in the same
order.
2. Liveness: Each request is correctly executed by correct nodes.
Such a protocol is commonly referred as consensus/replication protocol. Its decisions
are based on exchanged messages between all or a part of the nodes in the system.
Indeed, a consensus is achieved if the quorom, defined as the minimum number of cor-
rect nodes required to build the consensus, participate in the consensus process. The
quorum depends on the size of the system and the maximum number of tolerated faults.
Two fault-tolerant classes of replication protocols exist. In the first, called Non-
Byzantine, nodes fail only when they stop functioning. For n nodes, at most f = n−12
crash faults can be tolerated. Examples of non-Byzantine protocols include Raft [14],
Paxos [44], and Zab [45]. In the second class, called Byzantine, any type of failures can
be tolerated. However, they typically tolerate only f ′ = n−13 faults [46]. As Byzantine
protocols examples, we can cite Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerance (PBFT) [47], Effi-
cient Byzantine Fault-Tolerance (EBFT) [48], UpRight [49], Prime[50], and Byzantine
Fault-Tolerance State Machine Replication (BFT-SMaRt) [15, 51].
4.3. Built-in Fault Tolerance in Kubernetes: Raft Protocol
Raft is the replication protocol built into Kubernetes [14, 52]. Basically, it ensures
that the replicas maintain identical state machines, while tolerating only crash faults. It
is based on passive replication, where a node may be leader, follower or candidate, as
illustrated in Fig. 4:
• Leader: In a cluster, a single active node directs the communication, by receiving
requests, processing them, forwarding state machine changes to other nodes, and
responding to clients.
• Follower: When a leader is active, all other nodes are set as followers. They wait
for the changes sent by the leader to update their state machines.
• Candidate: When the leader breaks down, the followers become candidates and
trigger votes to elect a new leader.
The mandate of a leader lasts from its election until its breakdown. In order to or-
ganize elections, Raft assigns an index to each mandate. These indexes are called
terms. Any leader or candidate node includes the term index in its messages. Whereas,
a follower needs to wait for a random time, typically between 150 and 300 ms, be-
fore transiting into candidate. An active leader periodically sends heartbeat messages
Figure 4: Raft Protocol’s Election Process
(AppendEntriesMessage) to all nodes in the cluster. Any node receiving this mes-
sage resets its wait time to a random value. Otherwise, at the expiration of its wait
timer, the follower changes status to candidate and triggers a new election. The can-
didate proceeds as follows: 1) Increments its current term number, 2) votes for itself,
and 3) sends vote request (RequestV oteMessages) to all other nodes. The latter vote
for the request containing a term index greater than theirs, update their term index and
return to the follower status. Once a candidate receives the votes of the majority, de-
fined as df + 1e votes, it becomes the new leader. However, if no candidate obtains
the majority of votes, e.g. in a tie situation, no leader is elected in this term, and a
new term will be triggered by the node that sees its timer expiring first. The require-
ment for a majority of votes ensures that a single leader is elected in a term (Safety
condition), while the wait time of followers guarantees that a leader will eventually be
elected (Liveliness condition).
To run in Kubernetes environment, some changes have been made to Raft protocol:
1. Unlike the conventional Raft, where requests to followers are redirected to the
leader, Raft is converted to active replication to be conform to the load balancing
property of Kubernetes [52].
2. Raft is re-implemented in Golang, the same programming language used to de-
velop Kubernetes and Docker containers.
Besides Raft, another non-Byzantine replication protocol, called DORADO was pro-
posed for Kuberenetes [53]. This protocol is similar to Raft, but requires sharing the
master node’s memory to all instanciated containers in work nodes, in order to store
their state machines. This approach allows to achieve shorter consensus times than
Raft, but aggravates the containers’ isolation issue.
Despite their simplicity, Raft and DORADO are particularly powerless against
Byzantine behaviors [54]. Indeed, a failing node may not stop, and adopts continually
a Byzantine (random) behavior, e.g. not following the protocol, corrupting its local
state, or producing incorrect or inconsistent outputs [42]. To mitigate this problem, we
propose in the next section a novel Kubernetes platform, where both non-Byzantine
and Byzantine faults can be tolerated, while ensuring service continuity.
5. KmMR: A K8s multi-Master Robust Platform
Kubernetes allows to deploy and orchestrate groups of containers with a single mas-
ter node. The latter replicates the containers on different work nodes to provide service
continuity. However, if the master node fails, containers are no longer available and all
management data is lost. To avoid such case, the deployment of multi-master clusters,
where several master nodes cooperate, becomes necessary. However, duplicating mas-
ter nodes only does not provide complete fault tolerance [55]. In fact, this mechanism
must be associated with a replication protocol to ensure consistency between the mas-
ter nodes states, i.e., update operations to a replicated data item within the nodes should
reach and be executed at some time, in all master nodes, and in the same chronological
order [42, 56]. Such multi-master systems are important for critical applications, e.g.,
telecommunication and energy services, where the continuous availability of services
is required 24 hours a day, and 7 days a week.
In this section, we propose to create a resistant Kubernetes multi-master platform to
all kinds of faults, in order to guarantee service continuity. We consider a Kubernetes
cluster consisting of n replicated K8s master nodes and c work nodes. Work nodes
process clients’ service requests and send their reports (requests) to the master nodes,
as shown in Fig. 5. We assume that communications between nodes may experience
important delays, thus causing communication failures.
Figure 5: System Model
Figure 6: Consensus Process by BFT-SMaRt
5.1. BFT-SMaRt: Replication Protocol for KmMR
Among the known Byzantine protocols, only PBFT [47], UpRight [49] and BFT-
SMaRt [15] implement a Byzantine fault-tolerant replication system. The choice of
BFT-SMaRt is motivated by the following:
• BFT-SMaRt is very well suited for modern hardware, e.g. multi-core systems,
unlike other protocols such as PBFT [15].
• BFT-SMaRt outperforms other protocols, e.g. UpRight, in terms of consensus
time, defined as the required time to process a client’s request [15].
• BFT-SMaRt guarantees a high accuracy in replicated data, when a Byzantine
faulty behavior is exhibited within the system [15].
• BFT-SMaRt is a modular, extensible and robust library. It is able to provide an
adaptable library that sets-up reliable services [57].
• Unlike other Byzantine protocols, BFT-SMaRt supports reconfiguration of the
replica sets, e.g., addition and removal of nodes [58].
• BFT-SMaRt provides efficient and transparent support for critical and sustain-
able services [59].
In BFT-SMaRt, a consensus is established according to the following steps, as illus-
trated in Fig. 6. First, a work node broadcasts its request to master nodes, who trigger
the execution of the consensus protocol. Each instance of the consensus begins with the
leader master node proposing to other nodes a batch of requests in the PROPOSE mes-
sage. Master nodes validate the authenticity of the PROPOSE message and its content.
If valid, they register the proposed batch and broadcast WRITE messages with cryp-
tographic hashes of the proposed batch, to all other nodes. If a master node receives
dn+f ′+12 e WRITE messages with the same hash, where d.e is the ceiling function, it
sends an ACCEPT message to all other nodes. This message contains its decision batch
for the consensus instance. If the leader master node is not correct, a new election must
be triggered, and all nodes need to converge to the same execution by consensus. The
election procedure is described in detail in [60].
Figure 7: Integration Methodology of BFT-SMaRt into Kubernetes
5.2. Proposed Integration Methodology of BFT-SMaRt into K8s
The BFT-SMaRt protocol is implemented in Java, an object-oriented programming
language, while Kubernetes and the Docker engine are written in Golang, a service-
oriented programming language [61]. In order to integrate BFT-SMaRt into Kuber-
netes, two options can be considered:
1. Rewrite all BFT-SMaRt library’s source code in Golang.
2. Wrap the BFT-SMaRt library in a Docker container.
Unlike Raft, with a source code less than 3000 lines and easily rewrited in Golang,
BFT-SMaRt source code is larger and more complex, with approximately 100 files and
a total of 13500 lines of Java code. Consequently, the second option is more likely to
be realizable. This choice is supported by the advantages offered by Docker. Indeed,
Docker containers run fast and their introduced overhead is negligible [24, 22]. The
proposed procedure to integrate BFT-SMaRt into Kubernetes is illustrated in Fig. 7.
First, we recover the library BFT-SMaRt and all its dependencies from Github [57].
Then, we customize it by setting the parameters of the master nodes. Next, we create
our Docker file Dockerfile, as detailed in Fig. 8. Afterwards, we execute Dockerfile
to produce the BFT-SMaRt containerized image. Finlly, we instantiate in each K8s
master node the Docker image with its information.
6. Experimental Evaluation
6.1. Simulation Settings
We implemented the KmMR solution in an OpenStack cloud environment provided
by Ericsson Canada [62]. The available resources are as follows: 50 GB of RAM and
20 virtual processors (VCPU), usable on a maximum of 10 machines.
Figure 8: Dockerfile to Create the BFT-SMaRt Container
The experiment is carried out on clusters composed of several Kubernetes master
nodes (n = 5 and n = 7), connected to each other via the OpenStack GigabitEthernet
network and accessible from the Internet. Each node is a virtual machine equipped
with the Ubuntu server 18.04 TLS 64-bit OS, a dual-core i7 CPUs (VCPU) clocked
at 2.4 GHz, 4 GB of RAM and 20 GB storage capacity. The Docker engine 18.05.0-
ce is installed on Kubernetes nodes for container instantiation needs. We deployed
Kubernetes 1.11.0 to orchestrate the Docker containers. The master Kubernetes role
kubeadm has been enabled on all master nodes (multi-master configuration). The re-
maining machines are used to act as work nodes and DDoS attackers. BFT-SMaRt
has been containerized and integrated into the master nodes to provide coordination
and consensus. Work nodes send their requests in closed loop, i.e. they wait for the
response of a request before sending a new one, as defined in [63].
In the cluster, we initialize the replication protocol on master nodes. Then, two
work nodes broadcast their requests. Upon request reception, master nodes exchange
messages to build the consensus. To measure the performance of KmMR, we used the
micro-benchmark 0/0 where both request and response messages are empty [47].
DDoS attacks are used to model Byzantine behaviours, using the Hping3 command
[64, 65]. Indeed, we inject DDoS-based “CPU Load" and “Network Flooding" Byzan-
tine faults as follows [66, 67]. “CPU Load" fault is triggered by increasing the number
of users continuously sending requests to a master node, while “Network Flooding" can
be initiated by some master nodes towards others. We assume that attacking machines
target simultaneously a single master node. Each attacker sends successively and con-
tinuously requests of size 65495 bytes in open loop, i.e. without waiting for responses,
through the command Hping3 -f IP address of targeted master node -d 65495.
We evaluate the performance of our solution and compare it to the Kubernetetes multi-
Master Conventional (KmMC) platform, where non-Byzantine replication protocol
Raft is used. Two scenarios are considered for our experiments:
• Scenario 1: In this scenario, we consider a Kubernetes platform where, initially,
the number of (crash) faults in the cluster is lower than the maximum number of
faults tolerated by the replication protocol in place. This corresponds to f < n−12
and f ′ < n−13 for KmMC and KmMR respectively. Then, we perform a DDoS
attack on one master node, and evaluate the consensus times for each platform.
• Scenario 2: Unlike Scenario 1, the initial number of (crash) faults is set to be the
maximum that can be tolerated by the used replication protocol. Then, DDoS at-
tacks are performed on one master node. In this scenario, we evaluate established
consensus times as well as resources consumption by the DDoS victim (CPU,
RAM, and available communication Bandwidth). Resources are measured using
commands IPerf3 for Bandwidth, and top for CPU and RAM [68, 69].
6.2. Results and Discussions
Considering Scenario 1, we present in Table 2 the achieved consensus times ver-
sus DDoS attack rate of KmMC and KmMR, for a cluster of 5 and 7 master nodes
respectively. For both platforms, consensus times increase slightly and proportionally
to DDoS attack rates. Indeed, even with the additional Byzantine fault, f and f ′ re-
spect the maximum number of tolerated faults2. Hence, platforms’ operation continue
2Notice that KmMC sees the DDoS attack as a crash event in this case.
Table 2: Consensus Times (µsec) versus DDOS Attack Rate (Gbps) (Scenario 1)
KmMC KmMR
DDoS
attack rate
5 K8s Master
Nodes
7 K8s Master
Nodes
5 K8s Master
Nodes
7 K8s Master
Nodes
0 1701.91 2048.25 2746.45 3161.83
2 2004.38 2132.93 2940.87 3179.45
4 2178.72 2471.39 3362.42 4521.79
4.5 2201.37 2501.73 3525.17 4632.38
5 2287.65 2623.87 3612.93 4729.98
5.5 2304.12 2702.99 3867.32 4970.93
6 2331.12 2732.25 4053.53 4970.93
without significant degradation. However, KmMC realizes shorter consensus times
than KmMR. This is expected, since the replication protocol Raft is designed with few
consensus message exchanges between master nodes, compared to BFT-SMaRt. Fi-
nally, we conclude that it is recommended to select the KmMC platform if the risk of
exceeding the maximum number of faults, dictated by Raft, is very low.
For Scenario 2, we present in Fig. 9 the consensus time versus DDoS attack rate,
for a cluster of 5 master nodes. The results show that the consensus time increases with
DDoS attack rate. When the attack rate is below 4.25 Gbps, KmMC provides a slightly
better performance than KmMR. Indeed, in this case, the DDoS victim resists to the
attack thanks to its sufficient resources. However, for an attack rate above 4.25 Gbps,
KmMC deteriorates rapidly and significantly. This is mainly due to the vulnerability of
Raft replication protocol in front of Byzantine faults. Indeed, the DDoS victim would
behave improperly, e.g. not responding to other nodes in a timely manner. Thus, from
this moment, Raft triggers changes in the cluster’s leadership since it is no longer able
to reach a consensus with its current leader. This triggering considerably slows down
consensus in the KmMC platform. Meanwhile, KmMR resists to all DDoS attacks, and
is able to achieve consensus time 1000 times better than KmMC in average.
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Figure 9: Consensus time versus DDOS attack rate (Scenario 2, n = 5)
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Figure 10: Consensus time versus DDOS attack rate (Scenario 2, n = 7)
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Figure 11: CPU consumption rate versus DDOS attack rate (Scenario 2, n = 7)
Fig. 10 illustrates the consensus time versus DDoS attack rate in the same envi-
ronment as Fig. 9, but for a cluster of 7 master nodes. The same behavior is exhibited
for n = 5 and n = 7 master nodes. However, for n = 5, consensus is established
faster thanks to the smaller number of exchanged messages. As n increases, KmMC
becomes more susceptible to DDoS attacks. Indeed, the rapid degradation of KmMC’s
performance starts at attack rate 4.1 Gbps for n = 7, compared to 4.25 Gbps for n = 5.
Whereas, KmMR is able to establish consensus in a reasonable time, even for high
attack rates.
Figs. 11-13 present the CPU, RAM and Bandwidth performances of the DDoS
victim node, for Scenario 2 and n = 7. When the DDoS attack rate is below 4.5 Gbps,
KmMR uses as much or more resources than KmMC. This is expected since establish-
ing a consensus in KmMR using BFT-SMaRt requires a larger number of messages
exchange. However, for attack rates above 4.5 Gbps, KmMR and KmMC have almost
the same level of resource utilization. Indeed, Raft starts to make changes in the cluster
in order to regain its stability, resulting in higher resources consumption than usual.
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Figure 12: RAM consumption versus DDOS attack rate (Scenario 2, n = 7)
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Figure 13: Available Bandwidth versus DDOS attack rate (Scenario 2, n = 7)
6.3. Solution Limitations and Future Insights
When researchers proposed PBFT-like protocols, such as BFT-Smart, their main
concern was to enhance the performance of BFT in fault-free cases, while maintaining
properties of Liveness and Safety, when faults occur. BFT-SMaRt aims to be robust in
terms of high performance in fault-free executions, and correctness when faults hap-
pen. According to our experiments, it is clear that BFT-Smart is capable of surviving
in a small and partially uncontrolled environment, where Byzantine faults may occur.
However, it would reach rapidly its limits in a larger network, mainly due to its heavy
communication and limited scalability.
To reinforce resistance to malicious Byzantine faults, the notion of robust BFT pro-
tocols has been introduced by Aardvark, i.e., maintaining a constant and stable per-
formance in the presence of few Byzantine faults [70]. Indeed, several improvements
have been proposed, such as Aardvark [70], Spinning [71], and RBFT [72], in order
to efficiently handle some worst-case malicious Byzantine behaviors. For instance,
Aardvark tolerates nodes/replicas to expect a minimum acceptable throughput from
the leader [70], while Spinning changes the leader with every batch of requests [71].
Finally, RBFT [72] proposed to maintain a constant performance during a fault event.
It is demonstrated in [72] that Aardvark and Spinning performances are reduced by
at least 78% in presence of a fault, whereas RBFT degrades by only 3%. This is due
to RBFT’s design, where f + 1 protocol instances are ran, but only one executes the
received request.
Although interesting, the previous protocols would experience difficulties in managing
inconsistency in large scale systems [73]. Indeed, this type of management is relegated
to client nodes, although the reason to use a consistent BFT protocol is precisely to
avoid this responsibility to clients. One of the promising solutions is to concurrently
run independent processes aiming at achieving higher throughputs [74], which is the
basic approach to implement scalable blockchain architectures.
Blockchain, by itself, is a BFT replicated state machine, where each state-update is a
Turing machine with bounded resources. Unlike conventional BFT protocols where
fault tolerance is realized among a small/medium group of nodes through rounds
of message exchanges (votes and safety-proofs messages), blockchain achieves BFT
among a very large number of participants, where at each time period, only a sin-
gle message (Proof-of-Work -PoW- message) is broadcast by a participant. Adopting
known BFT mechanisms into blockchain has led to the proposal of hybrid solutions,
such as Byzcoin [75], Bitcoin-NG [76], Casper [77] and Solida [78]. These approaches
anchor off-chain BFT decisions inside a PoW chain or the other way around. For in-
stance, Casper is a proof-of-stack (PoS)-based finality system, which overlays a PoW
blockchain. By design, Casper allows to provide Safety and plausible Liveness, as
well as protect the system against long range revisions and catastrophic crashes faults
[77]. Moreover, innovative solutions in the age of blockchains, such as Honeybadger
[79], Algorand [80], and LightChain [81], revisit the BFT setting with greater scala-
bility and simplicity. Honeybadger is a demonstrative example of how BFT can build
a blockchain cryptocurrency [79]. It can reach consensus within 5 minutes using 104
nodes. By design, Honeybadger requires prior setting of a fixed number of consensus
nodes, which may be problematic in terms of targeted attacks that may either com-
promise the nodes or exclude them from the system. In contrast, Algorand, a PoS
approach, can achieve better performance without having to select a fixed set of nodes
beforehand [80]. Also, it is robust against malicious attacks, even from a malicious
leader, and scales better for a large number of clients. Finally, in order overcome the
low communication and storage efficiency, inconsistency and scalability problems en-
countered in existing blockchains, the authors in [81] proposed LightChain. The latter
is a blockchain defined over a skip graph-based peer-to-peer distributed hash table over-
lay, which achieves consensus through Proof-of-Validation (PoV), i.e., a blockchain
data is considered valid if its hash value is signed by a randomly selected number of
validators [81]. It has been proven that LightChain is a fair, consistent, and communi-
cation/storage efficient blockchain.
In spite of its limits, it is clear that the implementation of BFT-Smart into Kubernetes is
the first step into providing robustness to this popular Docker containers orchestration
platform. As future work, one could investigate the integration of more sophisticated
protocols to Kubernetes, such as the aforementioned ones, and test their robustness
to malicious Byzantine behaviours. Testing can be realized through the BFT-bench
framework introduced in [66].
7. Conclusion
With the increased importance of virtualization in cloud computing, Docker con-
tainerization is favored for its lightweight and efficient virtualization. This implies
the emergence of new forms of architectures organizing cloud services in containers,
ready to be instantiated in virtual and/or physical machines. Since the main objective is
to guarantee service continuity, orchestrating these containers may seem challenging.
Recently, Kubernetes has been adopted as the orchestration platform of Docker con-
tainers. Although efficient in managing containers, Kubernetes guarantees service con-
tinuity only in presence of non-Byzantine (crash) faults occuring within the system. In
fact, the current replication protocol within Kubernetes “Raft" cannot handle Byzantine
faults. In this paper, we propose a new orchestration platform capable of overcoming
this limitation in Kubernetes. The KmMR platform, based on Byzantine replication
protocol BFT-SMaRt, is presented. We detailed our approach to integrate the BFT-
SMaRt library (written in Java) into Docker and Kubernetes (written in Golang). Then,
we implemented a Kubernetes multi-master platform in an OpenStack-based cloud en-
vironment. The system is evaluated for two different scenarios, where initially the
maximum number of tolerated faults is either reached or not, and for two orchestra-
tion platforms, KmMC and KmMR. The results show that the conventional approach
KmMC is efficient and robust in a non-Byzantine and controlled environment, i.e.
number of maximum tolerated faults is not exceeded. However, in a Byzantine and
not fully controlled environment, KmMR guarantees the continuity of services, while
KmMC collapses in front of severe Byzantine faults. In a such environment, KmMR
resources consumption is typically stable, compared to KmMC. In future works, we
will investigate the integration of more robust BFT protocols into Kubernetes, in order
to ensure a better protection against malicious Byzantine faults.
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